Today, I’d like to write about “the Takaichi administration and fusion energy.”

Takaichi is not the kind of politician who just says “fusion is a dream energy source.” She was directly involved in formulating Japan’s first “national fusion strategy (Fusion Energy Innovation Strategy)” as minister in charge of economic security, and now, as prime minister, she is trying to move that strategy into the execution phase.

The key point is that she sees fusion not as a “research topic” but as an “industrial strategy.” For an energy‑poor country like Japan, fusion is not only a “clean power source with no CO2 emissions,” but also a potential game changer for energy security, determining how far the country can move away from a structure in which it must continually bow to resource‑rich nations. Takaichi has consistently sent strong messages about “raising Japan’s energy self‑sufficiency” and “early deployment of next‑generation reactors and fusion power plants.”

More concretely, the government is moving to revise the Fusion Energy Innovation Strategy to clearly state an ambition to “demonstrate fusion power generation in the 2030s ahead of the rest of the world.” The current trend is to shift away from vague talk of “it would be nice if we could do it someday” and instead decide, at the level of a concrete roadmap, “by when and to what extent” Japan aims to advance fusion.

Another important keyword is “industrialization.” Within the strategy, the goal of building a “fusion industry” is clearly articulated, involving not only research institutes but also startups and established companies. In Japan, we are already seeing the emergence of startups directly tackling fusion itself, as well as companies competing in surrounding domains such as components, measurement, control, high‑frequency power supplies, and vacuum technology. Public‑private industry councils and platforms have also begun to move, marking a shift in emphasis from “something in the world of researchers” to “an industrial ecosystem.”

Takaichi’s approach is distinctive in that it does not stop at “clean energy as environmental policy.” Instead, she frames decarbonization as GX (Green Transformation), tying it directly to energy security and growth strategy. Within that framework, fusion is positioned as one of the central pillars, and I understand her stance as a clear statement of intent that “Japan will also take a seat at the table where the next‑generation energy order is decided.”

Of course, fusion remains an area with extremely high technical and business uncertainty. The goal of “demonstration of power generation in the 2030s” is highly challenging, and with the United States, Europe, China, and others engaging in fierce competition, it is by no means a story in which Japan can easily pull ahead. Rather, we are at a stage where the real question is “how the nation chooses to place its bets, precisely because the risks are so high.”

Even so, instead of stepping back with a shrug—“it will never work anyway”—the choice being made is to say, “having judged that there is a credible path to success, we will, as a nation, take a serious bet on this once.” I feel that the fact that politics is squarely taking responsibility for that decision is something that deserves recognition.

In this second‑day blog entry, I have tried to move one step beyond the image of fusion as pure “romance” and to organize and clarify who is taking risks, and on what assumptions, through the lens of the Takaichi administration. On # 3, I plan to write from my own perspective about what is happening on the private‑sector side—especially among startups and investors.