Today I spent the day rereading and digesting the news about the February 12 meeting of Japan’s Growth Strategy Council Working Group on Fusion Energy (nuclear fusion). At this first session, the government laid out a roadmap that leverages Japan’s technological strengths: start construction of a demonstration power plant in the 2020s, launch a public–private demonstration project in the 2030s, and aim to establish a cost‑competitive power generation system ahead of the rest of the world. Numbers are also beginning to appear, such as an estimated global economic impact of up to 700 trillion yen around 2100, which strongly reinforces the impression that “fusion has finally been placed at the very center of Japan’s growth strategy.”

At first glance, this is a very positive development—“Japan is finally getting serious.” The basic flow—have the government lead R&D on key technologies for about the next five years, then connect this in the 2030s to a public–private demonstration power project—looks quite reasonable for a deep‑tech field. In a domain like fusion, where R&D costs are enormous and the investment payback is hard to foresee, it is the role of the state to build the first bridge. In that sense, the direction of “the public sector taking on the initial big risk and then drawing in private capital” is something that deserves straightforward praise.

At the same time, speaking as someone on the private side, I cannot help but worry about one thing: “Where, within this grand narrative, is there room for startups and VCs to enter?” Even if the documents say “public–private partnership,” there is a risk that, in practice, national research institutes and major heavy industry and electronics firms will be at the center, with startups relegated to being mere “technical collaborators” on the periphery. If we truly want to build fusion as a new industry, we need to design, from the strategic stage onward, not only the R&D of component technologies, but also “at which layers we want to increase the number of new private players” and “up to which stage startups and VCs will take the risk, and to whom they will pass the baton after that.”

Personally, I think the most interesting aspect of this policy is precisely that “very little has been nailed down yet.” Key questions—Which power generation concepts will we lean into? With what design philosophy will we build the demonstration plant? On which components will we try to seize the top global share?—are all still in the process of being fleshed out through the creation of the roadmap and discussions among stakeholders. That is why there is a significant opportunity for the private side to put forward proposals on time horizons and role‑sharing, such as: “This is the phase where seed‑to‑Series A startups should be taking the risk,” and “From this phase onward, the baton should be handed to infrastructure investors and operating companies.” As someone trying to build a fusion‑ and space‑focused VC, I am once again convinced that the crucial battleground over the next few years will be how to fill this “gap between policy and the private sector.”

In that sense, the February 12 meeting was less “the day Japan’s fusion efforts suddenly leapt forward” and more “the day the country finally started drawing the outer edges of the map.” Today, February 16, was a day spent looking at those rough lines on the map and asking myself: “Which players will fill in the inside, and at what speed?” and “Can I be one of the people who occupies a piece of that space?” I want to keep following the trajectory of this policy not as a bystander, but as a potential participant.